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AN EXAMINATION OF GODCHARLES & CO. v.
WIGEMAN
Wigeman was a puddler, employed by the firm of Godcharles
& Co. He brought assumpsit for wages. There was a dispute
as to the amount of wages which he had earned, and also as to
whether a part of it had not been paid. By the contract, he was
apparently to be paid $4 per ton, but what the size of this ton
was, whether it was composed of the statutory number of pounds,
2000 as he alleged or of 2240 pounds, as the defendants contended,
was one of the questions to be decided. During the time of his
employment, he had asked for and received from his employers
orders on different persons for goods, which orders had been honored by these persons and the price of the goods furnished upon
which by them the defendants had either paid or were solely
liable to pay. One of these orders which is a specimen of all,
read thus "William P. Stout-Let Vrank Wigeman have coal to
the amount of $4.25. C. A. Godcharles & Co." The second of
the disputed questions was, whether the defendants might set-off
the amount of these orders, from the claim for wages.
The objection to the assumption that the ton of iron was to
be taken to contain 2000 pounds, was that there were posted in
the mill, rules one of which announced that the wages paid was
$4 per ton of 2240 pounds. The court below held that the statutory ton, viz 2000 pounds, must be understood to have been the
ton in comtemplation of the plaintiff, because there was no sufficient evidence that he had seen the posted rule, or knew that it
was the custom of those who conducted mills of this kind to post
rules announcing wages. The trial court informed the jury that
1113 Pa. 431.
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if the alleged rule existed, and the plaintiff at the time of being
hired had actual notice of such rule, it became a part of the contract. It refused to say that constructive notice would have the
same effect. Apparently, the jury found that there was no actual
notice, and that the plaintiff was entitled to $4 for every ton of
2000 pounds puddled by him. Satisfied with their instructions,
Gordon, J., for the Supreme Court observes---"It requires no argument to establish the correctness of this ruling; hence we attempt none."
The plaintiff's objection was founded upon the assumption
that the act of June 29th, 1881, P. L., 147, prevented the use of
moneys paid or to be paid by the defendant, on account of the
orders, as a set-off.
This act deals with all persons, firms, corporations engaged
in mining coal, ore or other minerals, or mining and manufacturing them or either of them, or manufacturing iron or steel. Puddling is one of those processes. The act requires such employers
to settle with their employees at least once in each month, and
to pay them either in money of the United States or by a so-called
cash-order. The cash-order is defined to be one that purports
to be redeemable for its face value in money of the United States,
payable to the employe or bearer, within a period of 30 days, by
the employer. The issue of any other kind of an order is declared to be a misdemeanor. The act likewise forbids the employer, who is directly or indirectly engaged in merchandizing,
directly or indirectly to sell any merchandise to any employe for
a greater per cent. of profit than that for which they sell the same
sort of merchandise to other non-employe customers buying for
cash, and makes the price of goods sold in violation of this provision, non-collectible from the employe so purchasing.
The trial court instructed the jury that, under this statute
the orders given to Stout and others, could not be used by the
defendant as payment, pro tanto, of the plaintiff's wages. The result was a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of $87.67.
Apparently not questioning the accuracy of the conclusion
made by the trial court from the act of 1881, the Supreme Court
reversed the judgment, on the ground that the act was void. All
that Gordon, J., says upon the subject is "The first, second, third
and fourth sections of the act of June 29th, 1881, are utterly un-
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constitutional and void, inasmuch as by them an attempt has been
made by the legislature to do what in this country, cannot be
done; that is, prevent persons who are sui juris from making their
own contracts. The act is an infringement alike of the right of
the employer and the employe; more than this, it is an insulting
attempt to put the laborer under a legislative tutelage, which is
not only degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his rights
as a citizen of the United States."
It is seen that an important statute of the State was set
at naught by the Supreme Court. Since, however, the sovereign
people of the State have willed to create three departments of government, to one of which they commit the task of law-making, it
ought to be clear that no other branch should treat any act of the
legislative branch as void, unless it appears that that act is by
the constitution, excepted from the powers conferred on the leg2
islative branch. Said Sharswood, J., "By the constitution of
Pennsylvania art II, sec 1, the legislative power of the commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly * * Several restrictions are placed on this general grant, both as to its subjects
and the mode of its exercise, by the Declaration of Rights, art. 1,
and subsequent special provisions. To justify a court in pronouncing an act of the legislature unconstitutional and void,
either in whole or in part, it must be able to vouch some exception or prohibition clearly expressed or necessarily implied.
"To doubt is to be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the
act." All the legislative power of any State is bestowed on the
assembly, with such restrictions only as are found in the State or
the Federal constitution.3
What part of the constitution, whether State or Federal,
does the act of 1881, violate? The justice who superciliously
denounces it, does not think it worth his while to inform us.
Both constitutions are entirely silent upon the subject of the creation of contracts. Both forbid the passing of laws impairing
the obligation of contracts, but, before there can be an impairment of an obligation, whether of a contract or of something else,
2

Com. v. Butler, 99 Pa. 535.
TPowell v. Com. 114 Pa. 265,Com. v. Reeder, 171 Pa. 505; Sharpless
v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147.
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there must be an obligation to impair. No one, has ever propounded the preposterous notion that in virtue of this part of the
constitution, the legislature cannot prescribe that certain kinds of
contracts shall not have obligation or be enforceable.
The courts may think a certain provision of law would be
unjust or oppressive. But, the legislature, taking a different
view may nevertheless enact it. Whose opinion of justice is then
to prevail, that of the men whom the people have, under the constitution appointed to act for them in legislation, or that of the
seven lawyers who form the court and who have not been elected
to wield the function of an appellate legislature? One of the qualifications of the power of courts to declare statutes void' which so
good an authority as Cooley, enumerates' he thus states: "Nor
can a court declare a statute unconstitutional and void, solely on
the ground of unjust and oppressive provisions or because it is
supposed to violate the natural, social or political rights of the
citizen, unless it can be shown that such injustice is prohibited, or
such rights guaranteed or protected, by the constitution." Were
it clear to the judges that any body ought to be allowed to make
any sort of a contract, and that the State ought docilely to enforce all the contracts made, it is not their opinion on such a
question, but that of the legislators, that should determine
whether the State shall enforce contracts of any particular kind.
A world of trouble was spared to the court, when, declining
to suggest any provision of the constitution, Vederal or State,
which might be used as a justification, it contented itself with
assuming that, in some way, not explained, the constitution secures to men the right to make any kind of contract, and requires
the courts, when such contracts have been made, to enforce them.
The only limitation upon this right which the court concedes
is' that the makers of the contract shall be sui juris. The principle which, in its judgment has been outraged by the legislature
in passing the act of 1881, is that persons sui juris may make their
"own contracts." The learned writer of these words, may have
had some clear thought when he used them. It must be confessed however, that they were unfortunately selected if they
were intended to convey such thought. When A makes a contract, it is, we suppose, not B's, or C's or D's contract that he is
4Const.

Lir. 232.
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making. It is his "own." If the question were, whether a contract made by A, not with B, or C, or D, could impose obligations
upon, impair the rights, of B, or C, or D, it would be a very
different one from that which was in fact before the court. The
question before the court was not whether Wigeman's contract
should be Wigeman's, but whether it should be enforceable
against him. Instead of examining this particular contract with
reference to its economic, its moral, its social properties, in order
to determine whether the legislature could properly refuse enforceableness to it, the writer generalizes. He assumes that any
contract, made by a person who is sui juris, is to be enforced by
the courts despite the decision of the legislature that it shall not
be. The absurdity of this position is palpable. Any text book
on contracts exposes scores of contracts which, for various consideration, have been held not to be enforceable. The legislature, e. g., forbids an act, but a contract is made between A and
B. that B shall dispite the statute, do this act. The courts themselves have been gracious enough towards the legislative power,
both in England and in Pennsylvania, to deny validity to a contract, the performance of which would involve a disobedience
of Parliament or the General Assembly. The courts, sua sponte
have made contracts void for various reasons; because e. g., there
is no consideration, or there has been fraud, or accident or mistake, or because the performance of the contracts of the class
would work detriment to the public; would e. g. restrain trade;
would suppress the motive to prosecute felonies, etc. The courts
will hardly explicitly arrogate to themselves the exclusive power
to say what facts shall prevent the enforcement of contracts by
governmental agency. It is evident, then, that when the writer
of the opinion postulates as the principle of his decision, the right
or the obligation of men who are sui juris, to have all their contracts carried out, he is guilty of an exorbitant absurdity. Any
tyro in the law knows that there have been thousands of contracts
made by persons who are sui juris, which the courts have deemed
void. The justification suggested by the court, therefore, for refusing to treat as null the Wigeman contract, notwithstanding
the expressed will of the legislature that it shall be so treated, is
no justification at all.
It will be observed that Gordon, J., tacitly concedes that
some contracts may be deprived of enforcement or, at least, that
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some persons may be prevented from bindingly making some contracts. What the legislature is unable to do is to "prevent persons who are sui juris from making their own contracts." Those
who are nan sui juris may be prevented. But, what makes a man
sui juris, or non sui juris? When is a man sui juris? When not?
The law must determine what facts make a man sui juris, and it
does this by determining that when a certain fact exists, the person of whom it is true shall not have certain powers or responsibilities which inhere in men, of whom this fact is not assertable. Is he under 7 years of age? Then he shall not be
criminally responsible. Is he between 7 and 14? His responsibility shall depend on the existence of an additional fact. Is he
insane? Then his conveyances of property, his contracts shall
be void. Is a woman married? Then all or some of her contracts shall be void. Men and women are not unable responsibly to commit crime, or to make contracts, because they are not
sui juris. They are not sui juris because the law has said that
they cannot commit crime, because they cannot make contracts.
The expression non sui juris is not the expression of the cause of
a legal incapacity, but is a general name for the legal incapacity
itself. Because a married woman might, probably would, be
constrained or persuaded by her husband to make contracts,
which would be disadvantageous to her, she is not to be allowed
to make any contracts at all. Because infants would make many
injudicious contracts, would be despoiled by others through contracts made by them, they shall be allowed bindingly to make
only certain contracts. The reasons which prompt the law makers to withhold power to contract at all from married women,
and power generally, but not universally, to contract, from infants, from insane persons, may justify the annulment of contracts made in certain circumstances, by persons who, in other
circumstances are permitted to bind themselves. The power of
a person recently a ward to contract with the ex-guardian, of a
person subject to be unduly influenced by X to contract with X,
may be withheld, when the power generally to contract is freely
conceded.
Within the class of the iwn sui juris, the degrees of legal incapacity as we have suggested, may vary. Although everybody
below 21 years of age is an infant, some infants may contract
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liabilities, which others cannot. Generally they are all liable for
torts, but, when a negligent tort is committed against them, the
right of some to redress may be taken away by a contributory
act done by him, which the law allows to be treated as negligent,
while the right of younger infants may not thusbe takenaway,because they are deemed too young to be negligent. The incapacity of the infant to contract, meiely because he is an infant, is
less extensive than was the common law incapacity of the married woman. The intimation, then, that there are, before the law
operates on them, two classes of persons, those sui juris and those
IMw sui juris, that these classes are extra-legal, and the distinction between them ineffaceable and indefeasible, or that either by
the constitution of the State (which in truth is silent on the matter) or by the nature of things, they must be treated by the legislative power of a State in different ways, is baseless, the result of
heedlessness and superficiality of thinking. To lay down the
proposition that the legislature may restrict the contracting power
of non sui juris persons, a class which is not defined, but cannot
at all restrict the contracting power of persons of the sui juris
class, betrays a crudeness of thought which one scarcely expects
to discover in any lawyer who has attained an eminent position.
Certain relations have long been held to indicate that one of
the parties though in a sense sui juris, may imprudently agree
to do something for the other, may be unduly influenced. If this
undue influence is discovered, the contract will be held void.5
These cases often exhibit confidential relations. Sometimes
when personal influence is absent, but undue advantage is taken
of another's necessities, the contract is held unenforceable. 6
When A needs money, and B has it to lend, the law has long
said that A's contract to pay B more than six per cent. interest
shall be unenforceable. What Pennsylvania judge has ever said
that the usury law was void, because it is an insulting attempt to
put the borrower under a legislative tutelage? which is not only
degrading to his manhood [but the wretched borrower has never
felt this] but subversive of his rights as a citizen of the United
States [but he has never felt afflicted in being deprived of the
5

Clark, Contracts, 246.
eClark's Cont. 251.
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right to compel himself to pay 20 or 30 per cent. per annum, for
moneys borrowed].
Contracting parties often stipulate that, for breach of the
agreement, a defined sum of money shall be paid. On how many
occasions have the courts, on one pretext or another, held the
stipulation one for a penalty, and then, refused to enforce the
penalty? Have the courts the'pdwer to absolve from a contract
which the legislature has not? May they insult the contracting
party by imposing on him a judicial tutelage?
What is the statute of frauds, but a violation of the right of
contract? A agrees orally to buy a house from B and B to sell
it to A. The legislature insultingly says, you may be imposed on
by false testimony, unless you put your agreement in writing, and
the courts complete the insult by refusing to one of the parties,
the execution of the contract.
A and B make a contract on Sunday. The legislature insultingly says to them: You will risk your soul's salvation, if you
violate the Sabbath; or you will bring on the State the discontent
and displeasure of the Almighty and so hurt it, or, you need rest
on one seventh of your days; hence you must make no contract
on Sunday. If you do, it shall not be enforceable. But this
legislative tutelage over men's souls and bodies, has not aroused
the same judicial horror as that which the act of 1881 has
awakened.'
A having obtained a license to sell liquor at a tavern, contracts with B, a woman, to serve as waiter. B's act of serving,
under such a contract is made a crime both by A and by B. If
the performance of the contract was criminal, the contract itself
was unenforceable. But, nobody discovered; Paxson, J., did not
discover, that the act of March 28th, 1878, was an insulting attempt to put A, or B, or the men who might be drawn to the
tavern under legislative tutelage. It forbade the employment of
females in hotels, taverns, saloons, eating houses, or other places
for the sale of intoxicating and other drinks. While, taking the
morals of the patrons of the place, or of the waiters, under tutelage, it made performance of certain contracts criminal, it was
not invalid."
P. & L. Dig. 409S.
$Walter v. Common, 88 Pa., 137.
73
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Certain acts are thought unduly to expose those who do them
to loss of money. Instead of letting each adult man or woman
decide for himself whether he will take the risk, and lose the
money, the legislature not only insultingly attempts to put, but
with the connivance of the courts actually puts these adults under
a tutelage which is degrading to their manhood. A wants the
chance to win $100. if event X happens, and is willing to agree
with B to pay to B $100 if the event shall not happen, provided
that B shall pay him, A, $100, if the event shall happen. The
legislature making itself guardian of A and B, forbids the enforcement of their contract. The courts have been parties to
the insult.' The same impertinent projection of tutelage over
persons sui juris, is practiced with respect to lotteries."'
Although a person of "known intemperate habits," may be
sui juris, in the sense that his power to dispose of his money or
other property has not been taken away by the law, he may be
deprived, for his own good of course, of the power effectually to
contract for the purchase of liquor. The sale of liquor to him,
even by a licensed vendor, is a misdemeanor, made so in the exercise of a legislative tutelage, which is degrading to his manhood.'1
Persons sui juris may, ordinarily choose their food. If they
like oleomargarine, instead of butter, why shall they not buy it?
But, the act of May 1st, 1885, forbade the making of it, or the
having of it on sale, or the selling of it, under penalty. The prohibition was not confined to deleterious oleomargarine. It extended to any, wholesome and nutritious or otherwise. If A was
willing to buy and eat it, taking the risk of its wholesomeness, he
was nevertheless made incapable of doing so. He and his fellow
subjects were insultingly subjected to legislative tutelage. They
could not take care of themselves; the law-maker would take
care of them. The courts abetted the law-maker. This kind
of tutelage, insulting though the imposition of it was, was justifiable. The sale, and therefore the purchase of even pure oleomargarine may be made criminal.'2
Unger v. Boas, 13 Pa., 601; 3 P. & L. Dig., 4089.

203 P. & L. Dig., 4089.

112 Stewart's Purd. 2325, 2327.
22Powell v. Comm., 114 Pa., 265; 127 U. S., 678.
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A desires to have goods carried by a common carrier. The
carrier obtains from him an agreement by which its liability is
limited to $50, in case of loss occasioned even by negligence.
However, not the legislature, but the courts have insultingly,
[not attempted merely to put, but] put on the shipper and the
carrier their judicial "tutelage" which is not only degrading to
their manhood, but subversive of their rights as citizens, etc.
The courts have held that the shipper cannot take care of himself. He is not wholly free in entering into such a contract. It
shall therefore not be enforceable."3
The Carmack amendment of June 29th, 1906, to the act of
Congress of Feb. 4th, 1887 puts on an interstate carrier, receiving
goods for transportation, liability for the value of the goods, although they may be lost or injured by an intermediate carrier,
although the shipper may have agreed that there shall be no such
liability.14
A State law may constitutionally refuse to allow validity to
an agreement by one who sends a telegram, with the telegraph
company, that the company shall not be liable for its failure to
deliver a message to a person in another State."
A State may validly pass a law which forbids mine owners
to pass the output of coal mined by any employe over any screen
or any other device which shall take any part from the value
thereof, before the same shall have been weighed and duly credited to the employe, sending the same to the surface, and which
provides that any agreement to waive compliance with this requirement shall be void."5
An act of congress forbidding a shipmaster's paying a sailor
any part of his wages in advance, was held valid."
The right to contract for the hours of labor is not so secure
that the State cannot regulate the hours of labor. A statute making it a misdemeanor to employ workmen in underground mines,
or in the smelting, reduction or refining of ores or metals, for
"Grogan v. Adams Express Co., 114 Pa. 523; R. R. Co. v. Chenowith,

52 Pa. 382; Powell v. Penna. R. R. 32 Pa. 414; Clark, Cont. 318.
14
R. R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186.
25Telegraph Co. v. Milling Co., 218 U. S., 406.
16McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S., 539.
17Patterson v. The Eudora, 190 U. S., 169.
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more than eight hours per day, is valid, and .its penalties enforceable. 8
In Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison 9 a question very similar
to that in Godcharles v. Wigeman was presented. The company
mined and sold ore. There was a monthly pay day. If the employes wanted to be paid earlier, they could draw an order on
the company for a specified number of bushels of coal. If the
company accepted, this order was transferable, and the transferee would pay for it what the drawer was willing to take. The
company redeemed the order only by coal, charging against the
wages of the drawer, the amount of coal named on the order, at
12 cents per bushel. An act of the legislature was passed which
required all orders for wages to be redeemed in lawful money, at
the face value of the order. One to whom an order had been
transferred, sued the company, for the cash which the order represented, at 12 cents per bushel of the amount of coal named
therein. The statute was held bythe Supreme Court of Tennessee
and by the Supreme Court of the United States, to be valid.
The legislature says the former court, whose language is quoted
by the latter, "evidently deemed the laborer at some disadvantage
under existing laws and customs, and by this act undertook to
ameliorate his condition in some measure by enabling him or his
bona fide transferee at his election, and at a proper time, to demand and receive his unpaid wages in money rather than in something less valuable. Its tendency, though slight it may be, is to
place the employer and employe upon equal ground in the matter
of wages, and so far as calculated to accomplish that end, it deserves commendation."
Besides the prohibition against passing laws impairing the
obligation of contracts, the only phrases in the constitution that
are invoked by those who deny the power of the legislature to
forbid the making of some contracts, are the statements in the
declaration of rights that all men have the indefeasable right to
enjoy and defend life and liberty; to acquire, possess and protect
property, and to pursue their own happiness, that the accused
cannot be deprived of life, liberty or property except by the judg"8Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366.

19183 U. S. 13.
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ment of his peers or the law of the land. How propositions so
vague as these can be supposed to involve the principle that the
legislature cannot limit the power to make contracts, it is hard to
understand. But, since Gordon, J., has not enlightened us as to
the sources of his opinion that the right of a man sui juris to bind
himself to another by any sort of a contract, is indefeasible by
the legislature, we shall not consume space in pointing out how
vague these phrases are. The right to acquire property may be
hampered in many ways, both by the legislature and the courts.
To argue from it to the right bindingly to make any kind of a
contract would indicate the arguer's bankruptcy of common
sense.
The justice thinks the act of 1881 an infringement of the
right of the employer to enforce the contract to receive wages
in something else than cash. The rigbt was valuable to him, always. But the legislature thought it often injurious to the
workingman, and for his sake, forbade the contract altogether.
It is not the first time that a whole class of acts have been forbidden, because a considerable proportion of them would be injurious to somebody. The legislature must be permitted to prevent harm even to workingmen, at the expense of the nullification
of their contracts, and the deprivation of the employer of the
opportunity to gain an unfair or a harsh advantage.
In his Theory of Social Revolutions,20 Brooks Adams affirms
of the American constitutional system, that it "breeds in the
judge the conviction that he is superior to the legislator. His
instinct, under adequate pressure is always to overrule any thing
repugnant to him that a legitimate legislative assembly may
have done." Of this penchant, the case of Godcharles v. Wigeman is an eloquent expression.
20

Page 125.
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MOOT COURT
SMEATON v, RIDDLE
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Riddle had a mortgage for $2000 upon X's land to secure the ten equal
bonds, payable, the one at the end of one year, the second, at the end of
the second year, etc. Riddle assigned the first bond to Smeaton and guaranteed that it should be paid. The mortgage was foreclosed, the sale producing but $1600. This fund is undergoing distribution. Smeaton insists
that he must receive $200 with interest. Riddle, that he must be paid
ratably only.
Fanseen for plaintiff.
Goldstein for defendant.
ACTION OF ASSUMPSIT
WALSH, J. In the present case the question is essentially one of
ratable distribution. The question of priority of time is of secondary
importance; it is well established that the assignee of the first mortgage
bond of a series has priority in respect to assignees of subsequent bonds.
If the note or other obligation secured by the mortgage is not negotiable, the assignee thereof, like any other assignee of a non-negotiable
chose in action, takes its subject to all equities and defenses which existed
as between the original parties, such as illegality, failure of consideration,
part payment, and the like.
James v. Morey, 2 Con. (N. Y.) 246; Ingraham v. Disborough, 47 N.
Y. 421; Crane v. Turner, 67 N. Y. 437; Nichols v. Lee, 10 Mich. 526; Mott
v. Clark, 9 Pa. St. 399; Harstman v. Yerker, 49 Pa. St. 282; Fish v.
French, 15 Gray (Mass.) 520; Moffett v. Parker, 71 Minn. 139; Tiffany on
Real Property, page 1230.
The question whether the assignee of the mortgage takes free from the
equities of others than the mortgageor is determined by the general rule
prevailing in the particular jurisdiction as to the rights of assignees of
choses in action. The more usual rule is that the assignee of any nonnegotiable chose in action takes it free from any latent equities in favor
of persons other than the obligor, since he has no means of knowing
where to inquire as to such equities and this rule has been applied in favor
of the assignee of a mortgage.
Goldthwaite v. First Nat. Bank of Montgomery, 67 Ala. 549; Silverman v. Bullock, 98 Ill. 11; Viedenburgh v. Burnet, 31 N. J. Eq. 229; Moffett v. Parker, 71 Minn. 139; Losey v. Simpson, 11 N. J. Eq. 246; Mott v.
Clark, 9 Pa. St. 399.
The New York rule is that the assignee takes subject to such equities.
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Section 1 and 3 of the act of May 22nd, 1715, relates to the matter in
question.
"Section 1. All bonds, specialties and notes in writing made or to
be made, and signed by such person or persons, whereby such person or
persons is or are obliged or doth or shall promise to pay to any other
person or persons, his, her or their order or assigns, any stim or sums of
money, mentioned in such bonds, specialties, note or notes, may by the
person or persons to whom the same is or are made payable, be assigned,
indorsed and made over to such person or persons as shall think fit to accept thereof.
Section 3. It shall and may be lawful for the person or persons to
whom the said bonds, specialties or notes are assigned, indorsed or made
over as aforesaid in his, her or their own name or names to commence
and prosecute his, her or their actions at law for recovery of the money
mentioned in such bonds, specialties or notes, or so much thereof as shall
appear to be due at the time of such assignment in like manner as the
person or persons to whom the same was or were made payable might or
could have done."
In some cases the view is taken that, since the mortgage is merely
an incident to the debt, ifthe note secured is negotiable, the benefit of the
rule applicable to negotiable instruments will extend to the mortgage and
render it enforceable for the full amount, without reference to equities
existing between the original parties. Carpenter v. Longan, 16 Wall (U.
S.) 271; Paigne v. Chapman, 58 N. H. 333; Burhans v. Hutcheson, 25
Kan. 625; Kelley v. Whitney, 45 Wis. 110; Taylor v. Page, 6 Allen (Mass.)
86; Barnum v. Phenix, 60 Mich. 388.
In some cases it is held that the negotiability of the note secured is
immaterial and that the assignee of the mortgage, whether by mere transfer of the note or otherwise, takes subject to all existing equities, in favor
of the mortgagor at least.
Bailey v. Smith, 14 Ohio St., 396; Tubar v. Foy, 56 Iowa, 539; Kleeman v. Frisbie, 63 Ill., 482; Johnson v. Carpenter, 7 Minn., 176. Tiffany on Real Property, section 535, Freedom of transfer from equities.
Undoubtedly the assignee has the right to bring suit against the assignor and recover something.
94 Tenn., 513, holds that the assignee of several notes secured by
mortgage or vendor's lien share pro rata if there is nothing in the contract of assignment or in intention of the parties to vary the rule.
Counsel for plaintiff has confined himself mainly to questions of
guaranty and warranty.
Altho the rule in New York is otherwise, judgment is hereby given
for plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
Riddle was the owner of 10 bonds secured by a mortgage. He has
assigned the bond which was first to become due to Smeaton. The
fund produced by the mortgage sale is sufficient only to pay one-half the
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debt. The fact that Riddle is assignor of the Smeaton bond, does not
postpone him to Smeaton.
Nor does the priority of the time of
payment of Smeaton's bond to that of the bonds retained by Riddle, prefer Smeaton's. Donley v. Hays, 17 S. & R., 400; Perry's Appeal, 22 Pa.,
43; Cowden's Estate, 1 Pa., 278; Mohler's Appeal, 5 Pa., 420; Betz v.
Heebner, 1 P. & W., 280; Carneghan v. Brewster, 2 Pa., 43; Yarnal's
Appeal, 3 Pa.. 364.
But Riddle, in assigning the bond to Smeaton, guaranteed its payment. If he receives payment pro rata, of the 9 bonds retained by him,
he by that fact, makes payment of Smeaton in full upon the fund impossible, and makes his liability upon the guarantee absolute. Why then
should he be allowed to deprive Smeaton of full payment from the proceeds of the Sheriff's sale? We think Smeaton must be fully paid,
before any part of the fund is applied to Riddle. Fourth National Bank's
Appeal, 123 Pa., 473. Hancock's Appeal, 34 Pa., 155, seemingly concedes that, against Riddle, this would be the effect of his guaranty.
Cf. also, Mohler's Appeal, 5 Pa., 418. In Betz v. Heebner, 1 P. & W.,
280, the holder of 7 bonds secured by the same mortgage, assigned
three of them to Groeff, guaranteeing the payment of them. Subsequently the other four bonds were assigned to Betz. It does not appear that
Betz was aware of the guaranty of the first three bonds. The court
decided that all the bonds were ratably payable. From this cannot be
deduced that had the last 4 bonds not been assigned, the guarantee of
the first three would not have prevented payment of the last four, until
the three had been paid.
It is a little remarkable that neither in the briefs of counsel nor in the
opinion of the court, is any reference made to the above and other pertinent Pennsylvania decisions.
Since the result, however reached by chance, happens to be correct,
the judgment must be affirmed.

TYLER v. FIRE INSURANCE CO.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Tyler's father orally agreed that he might occupy for the rest of the
father's life a store, paying the annual rent of $100-a fair rent would
have been $300. Tyler procured an insurance from defendant to the
amount of $2000, the company being aware of the event of his interest in the building. During the fourth year of his occupancy, the
building was destroyed by fire. The company refusing to pay the policy,
this is an action thereupon for the whole amount. The mortality
tables showed that Tyler's father would probably live fifteen years more
when the fire happened.
Price for plaintiff.
O'Rorke for defendant.
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OPINION OF COMMON PLEAS
BRUEN, J. There are several questions raised by the above stated
facts. The main question in controversy is whether the plaintiff has an
insurable interest in the store? Second whether plaintiff has right to set
up estoppel under the facts of the case? Thirdly whether the insurance
company can raise the question of ultra vires?
The general principle of law is that if a man has an interest in property, a pecunia.v interest and it would be a loss to him in case the
property should be destroyed by fire, then he has an insurable interest.
The plaintiff in this case had such an interest that if the property was
destroyed he would suffer a loss. The fact however that the title of the
insured to the property is defective or invalid will not deprive him of
his insurable interest therein if he is in possession and use of the property under a bona fide claim of title, legal or equitable. As there is
nothing in the evidence which disputes Tyler's father's title in the property we are of the opinion from the authority as laid down in Mutual
Fire Insurance Co. v. Wagner, 7 Atlantic, 103, that plaintiff had an insurable interest in property. Wood on Insurance, § 274, page 503, states
the fact however that the title of insured to property is defective or invalid even will not deprive him of an insurable interest in property
if he is in possession and use thereof under a bona fide claim of title,
legal or equitable. Wood § 266, page 493, states it is not necessary that
assured should have either a legal or equitable interest, indeed any property interest in subject matter insured. It is enough if he holds such relation
to the property that its destruction by the peril insured against, involves
pecuniary loss to him or the person for whom he acts. It need not be an
existing jus in re nor jus in rem. Here the plaintiff was the son of the
owner of property and its loss would be of serious consequence to him.
Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Dougherty, 102 Pa., 568, held the
holder of an equitable title who has an insurable interest where equitable
owner represented in application that title was in her name, may sue for
loss to property by fire against Insurance Co. The Supreme Court of
Massachusetts said we are satisfied as the law stands that a bona fide
equitable interest in property of which legal title is in another may be insured under the general name of property or by a description of the thing
insured. Locke v. North American Insurance Co., 13 Mass., 67. Redfield v. Hollard Purchase Insurance Co., 56 N. Y., 344, held, "In conditions of a policy it was provided that if insured property be held in trust
or be a household or other interest it must be so represented to Co. The
Company in this case was aware of son's inheritance at the time the
property was insured and this is sufficient notice to Company. The plaintiff had a valid existing policy during his occupancy of premises and this
policy continued in force because of the agreement with company. As it
was in force for the purpose of collecting premiums, it certainly was in
force for the purpose of paying the loss which might occur to plaintiff by
fire and therefore securing indemnity against which these premiums were
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paid. They knew of his inheritance and that the policy was retained by
plaintiff and they undoubtedly treated it as an existing active policy in
full life up until time of fire. The Company demanded and received
from plaintiff as the lawful holder of this policy all the benefits and advantages which it was entitled to receive under it as a valid existing policy up to and until moment of the fire and it would be a perversion of justice to permit it now to deny its liability and allow it to escape the payment of its just dues under the contract. The Company is estopped from
pleading that the policy was invalid. Can they be permitted now to repudiate their own voluntary action and assert that it was a void policy for
want of an insurable interest in plaintiff. We think to permit such a defense would be highly inequitable and injust. When Company insured
premises, their actions through the issuing of a policy lulled plaintiff to
sleep by assurance that the conditions of policy had been complied with
and that his indemnity was secured. Therefore the Company is estopped
from denying legal existence of policy. Mentz v. Fire Insurance Company, 79 Pa., 475.
May the corporation avail itself of the defense of ultra vires? The
doctrine as laid down in 182 Pa., 206, holds that a corporation may not
avail itself of the defense of ultra vires when a contract in which it has entered has been in good faith fully performed by other party and corporation has had the full benefit of the performance of the contract. The
mortality tables shows that plaintiff's father would have lived fifteen years
when the fire happened and as three hundred dollars would have been a
fair rent, we think the plaintiff should recover $3,000. Under all the
facts of the case we think that the judgment should be for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
"Any person has an insurable interest in property, by the existence of
which he receives a benefit, or by the destruction of which he will suffer
a loss, whether he has or has not any title in, or lien upon, or possession
of the property itself." Eastern R. Co. v. Ins. Co., 98 Mass., 423; Gilman v. Ins. Co., 81 Me., 488; 17 Atl., 544. A verbal contract of sale of
land, bestows on the vendee an insurable interest. Keck v. Porter, 9
Kulp, 428. One who mistakingly supposed the land to be his, and who,
so supposing, obtained an insurance upon the building upon it, could
recover upon the policy. Monroe County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 5
W. N. C., 389. One who has a probability of being assisted from time to
time by X, based upon X's being interested in him and having in the past
aided him, has an interest in X's life, although he has no legally enforceable claim against X. Carpenter v. Ins. Co., 161 Pa., 9. We think the
plaintiff had an insurable interest in the property insured. Getchell v.
Ins. Co., 83 Atlan., 801. No deception was practical upon the company,
which was when it entered into the contract, aware of the extent of the interest of the insured.
The value of the store to the plaintiff was the difference between $100,

108

DICKINSON LAW

REVIEW

the rent which he was to pay, and $300, the "fair rent."- At the time of
the fire, the father and the plaintiff would probably live 15 years. During these years, the plaintiff would have gained, each year, $200. The
learned court below has allowed 15 times $200 to the plaintiff. The present worth of one dollar, payable in 15 annual installments, money bearing
five per cent. interest, is $10.38. The present worth of $200 for the same
time, would be $2076. The judgment of the court below must therefore
be rectified by substituting $2076 for $3000.
Thus modified, the judgment is affirmed.

JOHN DAWSON AND CHAS. DAWSON, BY HIS FATHER AND
NEXT FRIEND JOHN DAWSON v. CUMBERLAND
TRACTION COMPANY
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Chas. Dawson, a boy 15% years old, on the evening of January 22,
1912, about 6.15 o'clock was coasting eastward along an alley from Third
to Second Street in the Borough of Carlisle. The Cumberland Traction
Company operates a line of street cars on Second Street, propelled by
electricity. The usual running time of its cars is about 30 minutes
apart. The regular car running southward according to the schedule had
passed the alley and Chas. Dawson who knew of this, proceeded to coast
from Third to Second Street and as he emerged from the alley onto the
street he was struck by an "extra" car going south at a very rapid rate,
with the result that one of his legs was so badly injured that it was necessary to amputate it. Chas. Dawson did not know about the extra car and
claims that he did not hear the bell or the whistle. The motorman was
unable to stop the car until it had gone 200 feet from the scene of the accident. Chas. Dawson claims that he listened carefully for the approach
of the car. Two by-standers claim that the motorman did not blow the
whistle or ring the bell; the motorman denies this. There is a municipal
ordinance in Carlisle prohibiting electric cars from running at a greater
speed than 12 miles an hour.
There is a dwelling house at the corner of the alley and Second Street
which obstructed the view of the boy so that he could not see the car in
time to stop the sled and thereby prevent the accident.
This accident is brought by the father and son to cover damages for
the injuries.
Sohn for plaintiff.
Glauser for defendant.
OPINION OF COURT
STECKEL, J: It is well settled that in an action of trespass for
personal injuries caused by the negligence of the defendant, the burden of
proving negligence is upon the plaintiff. For the purpose of proving neg-
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ligence the plaintiff offers the following pieces of evidence: (a) that the
motorman was unable to stop the car until it had gone 200 feet from the
scene of the accident; (b) two witnesses testified that motorman did not
blow the whistle or ring the bell, which however was denied by the motorman; (c) a municipal ordinance prohibiting electric cars from running at a
greater rate of speed than 12 miles per hour.
The first piece of evidence that the motorman was unable to stop the
car until it had gone 200 feet from the scene of the accident is admissible
to show that the car was run at a great rate of speed. Physical facts are
admissible to establish the fact that the speed at which a car was running
was excessive. St. Louis Transit Co. v. Scudder 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 186.
The second piece of evidence that the motorman did not sound gong,
which however he denies, is admissible to show negligence and careless
running. In Carson v. Federal St. Ry. Co., 147 Pa., 219, it was held
where a car is running at a great rate of speed and the gong is not
sounded at crossings an inference of careless running is logical. As to
the third piece of evidence, the admission of a municipal ordinance regulating the speed limit is admissible in Pa., in connection with other evidence tending to prove negligence, in that the rate as prescribed in the ordinance is the rate which other men have set as the maximum rate at
which a car may run and the safety of the public be to some degree assured. Lederman v. Pa. R. R. Co., 165 Pa., 118; Reegert v. Thackery, 212
Pa., 86; Ubelman v. American Ice Co., 209 Pa., 398; Herron v. Pittsburgh,
204 Pa., 509.
The defendant contends that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence and 'cannot recover for the rule as laid down in 13 vol. P. & L.
Digest of Decision 21666 reads "where the negligence of the plaintiff contributed in any degree to the injury for which damages are demanded
there can be no recovery." The case, then, according to the defendant's
theory proceeds along the lines that ordinarily it is for the jury to decide
whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence or not, but that
there is an exception to this general rule "where the facts are uncontroverted, or are clearly established, and where the standard of care, incumbent on the party sought to be charged with negligence is fixed and the
measure of duty defined and determined, it is the duty of the court to declare the law as applicable to such facts, and whether or not they constitute negligence, and if in such cases the facts show that the plaintiff is
guilty of contributory negligence the court shall enter a non suit or direct
a verdict for the defendant." 13 P. & L. Digest, 21743.
In Lehigh Valley v. Greeneo, 6 Atlantic Reporter 246, the rule is stated
as follows: "Ordinarily the question of contributory negligence is for
the jury to decide. But where the facts and inferences therefrom are
undisputed, where the precise measure of duty is determinatethe
same under all circumstances
-where
a rule of duty in a given
exigency may be certified and accurately defined the question is for the
court and not for the jury." McCully v. Clark, 40 Pa., 406; Reeves v.
R. R., 30 Pa., 454; Schuva v. R. R., 107 Pa., 8.
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This principle we believe is applicable to the case at bar. The facts
are undisputed that a boy, 15% years old, was coasting in the evening
along an alley running from 3rd Street to 2nd Street. On Second Street
the defendant Co. maintains a street car system. At the intersection of
the alley and 2nd Street, there is a building which obstructs all view of
South 2nd Street from the alley. The fact that the plaintiff was 152
years old will be discussed later. We concede that the defendant Co.
was negligent and that the plaintiff listened for a sign of an approaching
car, and that he descended only when the regular car had passed all of
which shows that he was capable of appreciating danger and of taking
precautions against it.
But with all these precautions he was hurt. How? By the negligence
of the Co.? Yes. By his contributing negligence? Yes. And the reason is that it is impossible to avoid collision with an obstacle of any size
appearing upon the intersecting street. From the very nature of the vehicle and the scene of the accident, a team coming along Second Street
would be fortunate to avoid running into the coaster. One has little or
no control over a sled, its momentum will generally carry it along in a
straight line regardless of the will of the coaster. The extent of the
deviation possible, as slight as it is, is made unavoidable by the fact that
the location of the dwelling house makes it impossible to see any thing approaching the intersection of the Streets from the South. We hold then as
a matter of law that it is negligence per se to coast down an alley which
is intersected by a street upon which a Street Car Company operates a
road, when at the intersection of the alley and the street, a building is
situated which obstructs the view of the street from the alley. From these
facts there can be no other inference than that the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence and the case comes within the principle of the
cases supra, and the cases cited in Baker v. R. R. Co., 182 Pa., 336.
There remains to be considered whether the plaintiff comes within the
age in which he cannot be contributorily negligent. The doctrine applicable is at 14 the law presumes that he has sufficient capacity to be sensible
of danger and power to avoid it, and the presumption will stand until
overcome by clear proof of the absence of such discretion as is usual
with children of that age." 13 P. & L., 21680, Nagle v. Allegheny R. R.,
88 Pa., 35; Hunt v. Graham, 15 Sup. Ct., 42. There was no evidence in this
case that tended to show that plaintiff lacked the capacity to apprehend
danger, but on the contrary there was evidence that tended to show he
realized danger and had capacity to make plans to avoid it. Hence the
plaintiff can be guilty of contributory negligence, and we hold that he is
guilty of contributory negligence in the case at bar, as a matter of law,
and he is now non suited.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
There was evidence from which the negligence of the defendant could
be legitimately inferred. The omission to blow the whistle or ring the bell,
may, under the circumstances have been negligent, although we do not see
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how it was. It is not the duty of the conductor to be always whistling,
or ringing the bell. Why should he have done either or both, on this
occasion? The only circumstance that might conceivably impose the
duty, is, that an alley debouched into the street. Cf. Kline v. Electric
Traction Co., 181 Pa., 276.
From the facts, proved, it might be found that the car was moving too
fast. Upon the happening of the accident, an effort was made to stop
it, which did not succeed until it had traversed 200 feet. Perhaps a jury
could infer from this fact that the car's momentum exceeded that which
it would have had, had it been running at a proper speed. 13 Pa. L. Dig.,
22628. Perhaps the jury could legitimately have found that a speed of
more than 12 miles an hour, was excessive, and that the car was moving
faster than 12 miles per hour. The ordinance of the borough expresses
the opinion of the borough council as to a proper rate of speed, but this
opinion is not conclusive. 13 Pa. L. Dig., 22631.
It is hardly suggested that the running of an extra car, or the failure
to communicate to the plaintiff that it was about to run or was running
such a car, was negligence. The company must be allowed to run the
cars which efficient service to the public requires it to run, and without
notification to everybody in town that it is going to run this or that car,
on this or that hour.
Conceding however, that the defendant was negligent with respect to
speed, or the giving of signals, we fail to see that its negligence was the
cause of the accident. Does it appear that if the bell or whistle had
sounded, as it should have sounded, John Dawson would have heard it,
or would have heeded it? He says he did, not hear the bell or whistle.
He doesn't say that before deciding to take the descent which has proved
to be so disastrous, he listened for gong or whistle; and, not hearing
either, concluded that he could safely make the trip. So far as appears,
his conduct would have been precisely what it was, even if the proper signals had been given.
Did the excessive speed cause the accident? It does not appear that
had the car been going at a moderate speed, the boy would have been seen
by the motorman in time to arrest the car before colliding with him.
The boy emerged from the alley, at a high rate of speed, possibly. He
could not be seen before he reached the side of Second Street. Was he
seen by the motorman as soon as he came into Second Street? Hardly.
The event occurred at 6.15 P. M., on Jan. 22d. The sun had been down
for two hours. How much artificial light there was on the street does
not appear. While we are told that the car ran 200 feet from the scene of
the accident, there is no suggestion that the motorman saw the boy until
the accident. He therefore made no effort to arrest the car before the collision had actually occurred, nor was he under a duty to make such effort.
Then, how was the speed the cause of the collision? Had the car been
running 10 miles per hour, it would have as much struck the boy, had he
been borne by his sled upon the track, immediately in front of it as it
actually did.
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Would the result of the accident, had the collision been with a car
moving 10 or 12 miles per hour, have been less serious than they have
actually been? We do not know. We have no reason, in the evidence to
have an opinion on that subject.
The case then is destitute of proof that the negligdnt speed or the
negligent omission to ring the bell or blow the whistle, caused, in any
way, either the collision itself, or the lamentable result of it.
Had there been no conduct of Dawson which contributed to the accident, it would remain true that the negligence of the defendant was in
no way causative of the injury.
For the reasons stated, as well as for those advanced in the able
opinion of the court below, the judgment must be affirmed.

WESTMAN v. TELEGRAPH CO.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Westman, dealer in horses telegraphed to X that he had a horse that
-would suit him, which he would sell for $200. He requested an answer
within a day. Telegram was not delivered for thirty-six hours to X,
who meantime saw another horse and purchased it for $225. Westman
endeavored for two weeks to find a buyer for the horse and then sold it
for $150, all that could have been obtained for it from anybody. In an action for damages X is offered as a witness by Westman and testified despite objection of defendant that if he had received the telegram within the
day after it was sent he would have bought the horse for $200. The jury
rendered verdict for $50, plus interest on $200 for two weeks plus interest
on $50 from end of that time to rendition of verdict.
Motion for a new trial.
Reese for plaintiff.
Fry for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
RENARD, J. The facts in this case present the question as to what
is the liability of a telegraph Co., to a sender of a message for delay in
delivering of said message resulting in the loss of sale of a horse and
which message contained only an offer of sale.
We do not know how far apart the parties were at the time of transmission of the telegram but a reasonable inference would be that they
were not so far apart or in such out of the way places that a message
could not be delivered before 36 hours. This inference is supported by
the facts that an answer had been expected within twenty-four hours.
When a message has been accepted for transmission a failure promptly and accurately to transmit and deliver the same is not only a failure
of contract but a breach of a public duty. Reese v. W. 0. Tel. Co., 7
L. R. A., 583. And in case of negligence or default in regard to the trans-
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mission or delivery of a message, an action may be maintained by the
sender of the message with whom the contract of transmission was made.
McCormick v. W. U. Tel. Co., 38 L. R. A., 684.
A telegraph company which has been negligent in the transmission
and delivery of a telegram, resulting in its delay or failure to deliver it,
-will be liable for the damage which might naturally be expected to result
from its negligence, provided it has notice of the nature of the transaction
involved. To be so liable it is not necessary that the company have notice
of the details of the transaction, or of the particular damages that will
result from delay or failure to deliver. It is sufficient if the damages
claimed are such as might reasonably be expected to result from the circumstances. This brings us to the question whether the company had
sufficient notice of the nature of the transactions. In note 41 L. R. A.,
(N. S.) 1188 there is a collection of cases in which it has been held that
company had notice.
If the message shows that it relates to a commercial or legal transaction of value it is sufficient to appraise the company of its character, and
for failure to use due diligence it must respond in all special proximate
damages. Baerhans v. W. U. Tel. Co., Ind. App., 246; Note, Postal Tel.
Cable Co. v. Lathrop (Ill.), 7 L. R. A., 474. The telegram in the present
case, we think is such as relates to a commercial transaction and was
sufficient to appraise the company of its character.
The measure of damages in present case depends on whether or not
the testimony of X is admissible. The fact that the offer would have been
accepted may be sufficiently shown by testimony of the parties in connection with evidences of the circumstances tending to show that a reasonably
prudent person would have accepted the offer. In some cases, Mills v.
W. U. Tel. Co., 57 S. E., 200; Beatty Lumber Co. v. W. U. Tel. Co., 44
S. E., 309, it has been held that where the action is by the addressee it
cannot be established by his own testimony that he would have accepted
the offer, but a distinction has been made in this regard in other cases
according to whether the action is brought by sender or addressee, it having been held that where the action is by the sender the fact that the offer
would have been accepted may be shown by the testimony of the addressee.
Tel. Co. v. MacKenzie, 81 S. W., 581, sec. 42, L. R. A. (N. S.) 419; Carter v. Telegraph Co., 54 S. E., 274. It is often the only means of showing
such facts and is admissible thru necessity. Doster v. Tel. Co., 77 S. C.,
56; sec. 42 L. R. A., (N. S.), 419.
Where the subject matter of sale is of such a character that it has
no market value or that its market value cannot be readily ascertained,
the general rule is that the measure of damage is the contract price less
the best price which the sender could afterward obtain for it by the exercise of reasonable diligence together with the expense, if any of keeping
it in the meantime. Herron v. W. U. Tel. Co., 90 Iowa, 129, 37 Cyc.,
1764-1765. But as the transaction in present case was only an offer and
not a sale the measure of damages would be the difference between the
price of which the property was offered and its actual market value at the
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time when a telegram accepting the offer should have been delivered,
Alexander v. W. U. Tel. Co., 3 L. R. A., 71.
There is nothing in present case which would lead us to believe that
the plaintiff did not obtain the highest possible price for the horse. On the
contrary we find he endeavored for two weeks to find a buyer and then sold
the horse for $50 less than he would have received if the telegram had
been delivered promptly. Interest was properly allowed.
Motion for new trial dismissed.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
Should the telegram have been sooner delivered? It contained an
offer of a horse for a definite price. It also requested an answer within
24 hours. The telegraph company was therefore aware that it was important to the sender,,that the message should be expeditiously delivered.
For loss resulting from delay, it should be responsible.
If the telegram had been sent, it is not self-evident that the offer contained in it, would have been accepted. If it would not have been accepted, no apparent injury to the sender would have happened. That it
would have been accepted, is and must always remain less than certain.
That some possibles would, under certain circumstances, have become
actuals, is a matter of probability only. Would the mind of the sendee
have formed a purpose to accept, had a certain fact, viz., the presentation to it of the offer, been communicated to him? We can hope only to
attain a sense of probability, not of absolute confidence, respecting such a
state of mind, such a volition.
May we be assisted to the formation of an opinion by the testimony of
the sendee? Can he know what he would have done, had facts existed
which did not exist? He may know that he was wanting a horse, was looking for one, was willing to pay $200 for one having certain qualities. He
may therefore be convinced that, had the particular horse been offered to
him for $200 he would have bought him.
Is he a competent witness to his readiness and inclination to do such
an act? Who could know better than he? A man may testify to his
intent, e.g., in doing a certain act not to abandon a lease of coal. Arnold
v. Cramer, 41 Super. 8; Bartley v. Phillips, 179 Pa. 175; Building Assn.
v. Hetzel, 103 Pa., 507. 1 Wigmore, p. 716.
If intention can be proved by the person whose it is alleged to have
been, other states of mind can be similarly proved, e. g., his knowledge, his
motives. So, we think, his potential purpose, his looking for a horse with
intent to buy one, his readiness to pay $200 for a satisfactory horse; that
he would have thought the horse in question a satisfactory one, could be
proved by him. He can infer what his purpose, with respect to this horse,
would have been, had the information reached him that it was for sale,
although the purpose never in fact existed, and although its formation
under certain unrealized circumstances, is a matter of opinion and inference. A subscribing witness who has forgotten the act of subscribing,
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may recognize his handwriting and express the opinion that he would
not have subscribed, had he not been cognizant of the executions of the
instrument, and been requested to sign by the grantor, testator, etc.
It would be difficult in many cases, to contradict the witness concerning his own past state of mind, but it is not a rule of evidence that nobody can testify to a fact, unless it appears that some other person is cognizant of the transaction and can be secured to testify about it.
In this case there is important corroboration. Within twelve hours
after the expiration 9- the time designated in the telegram for a reply, the
sendee actually bought a horse, and paid for it $225. This act reveals a
horse buying proclivity, operative at the very time that the telegram would
have been delivered, had proper diligence been exercised by the the telegraph company.
The propriety of receiving testimony from X that he would have accepted an offer, by telegram, had it been duly delivered has been recognized. Telegraph Co. v. Sights; 126 Pac. 234; Telegraph Co. v. Mackencie
81 S. W. 581; Lathan v. Telegraph Co., 94 S. W., 554.
The opinion of the learned trial court well supports its judgment,
which is therefore affirmed.
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BOOK REVIEW
Cases on Constitutional Law, by James Parker Hall, Dean of the Law
School of the University of Chicago. West Publishing Company, St.
Paul, Minn.
This work, embracing over 1400 pages, is one of the very best in the
excellent series of case books issued by that most enterprising of law
publishers, the West Publishing Company. The work is divided into three
parts and an appendix. The first part deals with making and changing
constitutions; the judicial function in enforcing constitutions, and the
separation and delegation of the powers of government. Among the ten
chapters of the second part may be mentioned chapters on personal
and religious liberty, the protection of accused persons, the operation of
the 14th amendment in securing civil rights, due process of law, taxation,
eminent domain, restrictive laws. Part third deals with, the Federal
Government, the general scope of federal powers, foreign relations, Indians and aliens, the territories and dependencies, federal taxation, the
regulation of commerce, international relations, the jurisdiction of federal
courts. In the appendix is presented the text of the Constitution of the
United States.
The selection of cases strikes us as very judicious. The most important decisions on all topics may be found here. Valuable notes are
frequently interspersed. Since the two volume collection by Thayer, this
is the most comprehensive that has appeared. It contains many decisions
which have been delivered since the publication of Thayer's book. The
price of Hall's Cases is remarkably small in view of the ample size of
the book.

